

*Mrs. Woodruff, avec les compliments
de l'auteur & ses respects -
Quebec, 28 aout 1905.*

The Fight for Canada

By **MAJOR WOOD**

and

The Fight with France for North America

By **A. G. BRADLEY**

Reviewed by

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**THE ATTENTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESS WHO HAVE NOTICED
MR. BRADLEY'S BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY CALLED TO THE REMARKS ON THE SAME
BY THE PRESENT REVIEWER.**

The EDITH *and* LORNE PIERCE
COLLECTION *of* CANADIANA



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Casgrain - Broadly polemic!

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Selwyn P. Griffie

The following article on Major Wood's book appeared in the "Quebec Daily Telegraph," January 21, 1905 :—

THE FIGHT FOR CANADA

Interesting Sketch of Major Wood's Book by Mr. *P.-B. Casgrain*,
Ex-President of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec.

THE FIGHT FOR CANADA, a naval and military sketch from the history of the great imperial war, by William Wood, Major 8th Royal Rifles, Canadian Militia; secretary, Quebec branch of the Navy League; president, Literary and Historical Society of Quebec; Westminster, Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 2, Whitehall Gardens, 1904.

This work, as regards its best and most salient part, is more than a sketch. The author is a painstaking scholar, of classical learning and no mean erudition. He is possessed of a masterly command of the English language, and many of his pages often recall the colour of Macaulay's pure Anglo-Saxon style. He is fair and impartial; his mind is unbiassed and totally free—though belonging to a different creed—from the old and among us now fortunately obsolete prejudices against the Roman Church. He plainly contrasts with Bradley, a superficial compiler on the same subject, a man who does not attempt, as he says, "to address the serious reader." (p. VI.) and who is not yet able, in this twentieth century, to eradicate antiquated and bubble-like aspersions from the atavism of his narrow brain.

Major Wood's volume, on the whole, is well conceived, ably written and highly worthy of success; moreover, we venture to assert it will have a recognized permanent value, being generally accurate, discriminating and judicious.

Its predominant feature is a new historical development of the effective agency and preponderance of the navy and sea-power of England throughout Pitt's expedition against Quebec; the importance of which, as the author rightly observes, has hitherto been left in the shade by preceding writers.

This part of his work is fully and truthfully dealt with, and brings out the whole matter in its proper light, combining both naval and military operations in a systematic and single plan of warfare. This

standpoint is undoubtedly well taken and deserves much praise for its timely innovation. The whole period of the Seven Years' War is treated from an elevated point of view, is brief, comprehensive and lucid. As such it forms a well drawn sketch.

As we intend confining our remarks to the matters more in direct touch with the ending of the expedition, we regret having to leave aside the interesting biographies and contemporary events abroad, as less connected with our purpose, and come at once to the finale, the all-absorbing issue, that is, the battle of the Plains of Abraham.

Much controversy and some warm public feeling (1) have lately arisen in Quebec as to the precise site of the battle and of the English line, and very likely will continue, not so much as to the general features

(1) The origin and cause of the controversy respecting the site of the battle requires to be noted, to show how a bias may arise.

What is now called the Race-Course or the Plains of Abraham, some 84 acres in extent, on the Heights of Quebec, would have reverted in 1902 to the Ursuline Nuns of Quebec as their freehold, at the expiry of a lease to the Government. They believed it was their interest not to part with it, whilst the public at large were anxious to have it bought in order to form a park to be held as a public domain and a national memorial of the famous field of battle, of which it was alleged and believed to form a part. If it could be proved it did not, then a clear case for valid and reasonable retention on the part of the Ursulines against a patriotic but imaginary claim was certainly made out; and this independently of their absolute title.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Doughty published his paper, "The Probable Site of the Battle of the Plains," considered at the time a conclusive plea for the Nuns. The Hon. M. Chapais also rose as a champion of the same ladies, and several articles appeared in his paper, the *Courrier du Canada*, to prove that not a drop of English or French blood had been shed on the 84 acres, except that of fallen jockeys and horses. Mr. Chambers stepped in to eulogize Mr. Doughty's irresistible arguments, and with more haste than judgment said many things which would, as now appears, have been better left unsaid. "*Qui prouve trop, ne prouve rien.*" Distorting Hawkins and breaking through open doors could not long avail.

The other side of the question was warmly advocated in the press; and the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, as in duty bound, took much interest in it. It published divers contributions, through Sir James LeMoine and others, and the President gave two public lectures on both battles of the Plains and Ste. Foye. Mr. Doughty's able paper carried at the time much weight as an authority, both for its novelty and also for another cause, as he attracted a good deal of sympathy from a large class of the Roman Catholic faith. So did Mr. Chapais in advocating the cause of a deserving religious institution. Public opinion became aroused on both sides; a thin shadow, but well disguised, of a semi-religious question was in the air; meetings were held and delegations were sent to Ottawa to press the Dominion Government for a solution, and to purchase the Plains. This was finally obtained and effected in 1901, as desired, to the satisfaction of all parties, and especially of the Quebec Literary Society, whose strenuous exertions may be said to have carried the day.

of the fight, which have not been and cannot be materially altered from what we know and gather from the earliest narratives to be found in contemporary writers—as Jeffereys, Entick and Mante, and principally those others, who could each say, *quorum pars magna fui*, as Knox, Johnstone, Fraser, etc., etc., but in order to ascertain particular details of lively interest to Canadians, though of minor importance to history in general, and to outsiders whose attention is directly drawn to the glory and the immense results of Wolfe's victory.

On these minor points, it requires an open and truthful mind to get rid of preconceived notions and ideas, when they have already been elaborated to enhance or colour adopted views, or some special point in a case. Impartiality is a disposition not to be found in prejudiced opinions. This remark applies equally well to the writings of an author and to the criticism of a reviewer, who may be taxed with having upheld different impressions on the different points at issue.

But history, now, is no more the romantic picture of events, men and women, embellished with a fluent and coloured style; or the description of bucolic scenes here, and crashing thunder-storms there, which fill up Bradley's pages in "The Fight with France for North America." It is reckoned an exact science, *une science positive*, in algebraic form of reasoning. The author ought simply to state the facts in their true nakedness, as in the Scriptures, Josephus, Caesar, Tacitus and the most ancient historians, and give at once the reference, without comment or reasoning on his part. The reader will supply these for himself, in preference to being led by the nose. To pass judgment on men and events requires a master-mind, accurate knowledge and matured experience, in order not to fall into error, and particularly into the common one of reasoning, *Post hoc ergo propter hoc*.

Major Wood is in his thirties and writes with the flush vigor of talent and youth; time will modify his spirit, and temper his warmth to a cooler mode of enunciating his comments and expressing his appreciations. Bryce, in his "American Commonwealth," is an admirable example and guide to follow in this respect.

When details are entered into, they must be described with perfect exactness and undoubted truth, so that men may see through men and their actions, and detect the inner springs of action in motion. From these only can proper deductions be drawn.

Thus, Major Wood revives many interesting incidents and traits, which, though already recorded elsewhere, are read with renewed pleasure when presented in his volume. Some depict the character of men of undaunted courage, stoic firmness, high-minded purpose, devotion and self-sacrifice; others are instances of noble and heroic deeds. They are all precious and ever to be commemorated and set up as examples for our countrymen. Their proper treatment distinguishes those his-

torians who can render such features of history not only instructive, but also useful as high moral lessons, when common writers are only attentive to make them agreeable.

But when they become distorted through prejudice, ignorance or want of attention, or proper perception of facts and names generally known to writers and to the general reader, they create an unfavorable impression against the author, and make the reader feel inclined to close the book in disgust. As when Bradley ("The Fight with France for North America," p. 384), transfers the obelisk to Wolfe and Montcalm from the *Jardin du Fort*, in Quebec, to the Heights of Abraham, confounding together the two distinct monuments and the two most interesting and celebrated historical memorials in the annals of the Dominion; or when he wrongly spells French names, familiar in Canadian history, and writes de Villars for de Villiers, Bois Herbert for de Boishébert, de l'Ours for St-Ours, Conteau for Coteau, etc., etc.

These are trifles, which, with many others of the same category, and divers inaccuracies, hurt nobody but the author who thus exhibits a standing proof of his poor erudition.

It is otherwise when he becomes wilfully offensive, and at the same time inaccurate; as, for example, when from his school-boy desk, he fancies seeing in Quebec, across the ocean, (p. 305) "The great cathedral where the memories and trophies of a century's defiance of the accursed heretics had so thickly gathered," etc.

In answer to this, we may say:

(a) There were no such trophies and memories before the Seven Years' War, except, perhaps, the flag of Phipps, belonging to the church of Notre Dame de la Victoire, shot down in 1690 and bravely secured at once, amidst a shower of bullets by a few sailors, who rowed up from shore, when they saw it floating down the river.

But at the beginning of the war two out of the five British standards which had fallen to Montcalm at the battle of Oswego in 1756 were hung in the Cathedral of Quebec, and not all of them in the church at Montreal, as Bradley will have it. (p. 157.)

(b) A "century" is too long a stretch before 1759 back to 1690 in our short Canadian annals.

(c) The "defiance" is a new fiction and childish mockery. The trophies meant glory to the Lord of Hosts for His blessings.

(d) The "accursed heretics," if at all mentioned in this church, were prayed for and never cursed.

(e) "Thickly gathered" is an ornamental figure of speech, hyperbole at least. Phipps' flag, the only one, was intended for the church of Notre Dame de la Victoire, which was built to fulfil a vow made on that occasion for the relief of Quebec.

Nevertheless, all these, so combined by Bradley, must be taken (p. 377) as "Canadian precedents and the unblushing blood-thirstiness of so many of the priests"; (p. 52) "Priests of the cold-blooded and bigoted stamp." Is this vituperation intended as an excuse or atonement for the **savage** butchery of Father de Portneuf, the parish priest of l'Ange-Gardien, by the Rangers?

The power of fiction of this Mr. Bradley equals, if it does not surpass, (p. 376) "that of the French priests, to whom fiction seems" (to him) "to have been a positive pleasure."

Overlooking other similar effusions, "made lucid enough for the transatlantic English mind" (p. VIII.) and therefore recently printed in Canada for export, it is refreshing to return to Major Wood's sensible and quite different tone and method of treating the same historical period.

He has had the advantage of complete access to the large and **valuable** collection of papers and plans, etc., of Dr. Doughty, and while following him closely as the most responsible writer of "The Siege of Quebec," he fairly grants him full honor and credit for the use of his fruitful researches; but, at the same time, he may also have stepped into some of his *faux pas* and casual errors, as will be seen.

To give full value to all these documents requires more assiduity and thought than seems to have been bestowed by Mr. Doughty and his three joint collaborators in "The Siege of Quebec;" (1) for it will appear

(1) The two following instances, among others, will show undue haste, carelessness and singular inadvertence among the four collaborators.

The joint writers report as a fact a physical impossibility, thus stated at page 96, Vol. III.: "Where Wolfe, etc. * * * the boats floated noiselessly down, away from the ships on the following tide * * * and the rustle of a strong south-west breeze conveyed no sound of the movement of the water." Dussieux confirms this strong wind, p. 230: "*Et poussés par un vent extrêmement fort, dit Joannès, qui aidés de la marée baissante et d'un vent du haut de la rivière extrêmement fort.*" (Doughty, Vol. p. V., 225).

"As soon as the troops in the flat-bottomed boats had got well under weigh, a number of Admiral Holmes' division moved slowly up the river, eagerly followed by Bougainville, and in due time reached Pointe-aux-Trembles."

We leave it to any mariner, or even a landlubber, to judge whether such navigation was possible against wind and tide, "*contre vent et marée.*" All that could be done was to keep the ships at anchor against such wind and the falling tide.

Besides the channel there is much too narrow for a man-of-war to tack about.

All this for deceiving Bougainville!

See contradictions, Vol. III., p. 107, and Vol. V., p. 322; also Admiral Saunders' report.

Parkman gives the correct account in "Montcalm and Wolfe," Vol. II., p. 283:

"The tide was still flowing and the better to deceive him (Bougain-

that, when discovered and laboriously collected, there remains the still more difficult task of digesting and arranging them. Time and leisure for steady work in sorting, valuing, eliminating and co-ordinating them, are necessary elements to a complete and judicious sifting of the whole mass of evidence produced, and for a careful examination, scientific study and comparison of all the plans adduced or known, so as to fit them exactly, once for all, if possible, to the actual ground and events. Otherwise, a correct apprehension of all the details of the whole course of events cannot be fairly grasped and well rendered.

While claiming for himself these preliminaries, Major Wood can candidly admit having been guided all along by the careful and pointed assistance of Mr. Doughty, and by his views on the same subject. Both worked, jointly or severally, in the same groove.

Therefore their works may be regarded as twin brothers, being very nearly or altogether derived from the same sources, so far as details are concerned; and both authors pretend to convey the impression that these last contributions are a sort of high-water mark for all time to come in the history of the conquest of New France.

To those who study them carefully, it will not probably appear so clear that they are the climax of learning on the subject, for parade of scholarship may be attended with demonstrated error. An uncompromising *parti pris* may lead to perverse ingenuity, (in general, but not at

ville), the vessels and boats were allowed to drift upwards with it for a little distance, as if to land above Cap Rouge."

Concerning Stobo another palpable mistake will be found at page 116, Vol. II., "July 23rd."

"The French sent a detachment of three hundred men under 'Sieur de Robeau,'" (evidently Stobo is here meant, according to the following designation of him, "one of the hostages who had escaped from Fort Necessity") to Pointe-aux-Trembles."

Firstly. Stobo had not escaped, but had been given up as a hostage at the capitulation of the Fort on the 3rd of July, 1754, together with Jacob Vanbraam.

Secondly. This detachment could not possibly have been sent under Stobo, the very man who, together with a French transfuge by the name of Docier, the younger, had guided Wolfe on that expedition to Pointe-aux-Trembles, and was with him on the 22nd day of the same month of July, and indicating to him then and there the Foulon pass, when the ladies captured at the former place were returned and landed at l'Anse-des-Mères.

The inaccuracy of this story is the more flagrant because its absurdity appears on the preceding page 115, where the following quotation is given from Montcalm's journal of the same date, 22nd July:

"It is he (Stobo), they say, who conducts everything, and he is in a position to give a good account of the condition of our colony in every respect."

Such mistakes need no comment and we will leave it to the joint authors to settle it among themselves, in "chambers", who is Liddell and who is Scott.

all meant in this case), and to stubbornness against discovered truth. A theory once adopted, on being formulated, finds all the facts of the case assorted to it, as is shown in the first paper on the probable site of the battle of the Plains published by Mr. Doughty in 1899, and now disavowed *de facto* by himself; and the same bias, more or less strong, is observed running through his subsequent writings.

The conclusions of both authors are given to the world as based upon the result of prodigious researches and erudition, and the whole lot of documents compiled in Mr. Doughty's three last volumes, being of a nature highly acceptable to that large public, who are ready, like the *moutons de Panurge*, to accept them at sight—make these conclusions of Messrs. Wood and Doughty pass *in globo* as infallible truths.

But when properly examined, it will be seen that the whole structure, far from being an impregnable castle, shows many points of weakness.

Now, we Quebeckers, who have the whole field of battle under our own eyes, ought to be able, with the full assistance of the material thus offered, to re-enact the battle as accurately as it was fought, and mark every spot of importance, from the landing at *l'Anse-des-Mères* to the end of the strife, at the King's Mill, near the *pont de bateaux*. But, with all this available information and boasting of novelty and finality, who can with certainty put a slab on the very spot where the climbing of the cliff was effected? Wolfe headed the first landing in person and saw at once he was carried lower down than the point he had intended, and had indicated to Moncton as being below *L'Anse-du-Foulon* and Vergor's Post; "a little lower down," says Townshend in his despatch; "considerably lower down," in his Journal; "almost under the walls of the town," writes Calcraft; so others say as to many of the boats. The possibility of an ascent right in front of the spot where he landed appeared to Wolfe more than doubtful. It was dark, there was a short suspense, and then and there the scaling of the cliff was tried. Where is the exact spot?

Vergor's post was somewhere near the top of the Foulon Hill; was it on Marchmont or Wolfe's Field? The Dutch map, in the British Museum (Doughty, Vol. II., p. 257), places the line of white tents on Marchmont, as seen by Wolfe, and the landing of course was to be sufficiently lower down the river, so as not to be overheard. Where was the crossing of the obstacle, the deep ravine of the Ruisseau St. Denis? The Belleborne Bridge? The St-Michel house? The Samos battery near it? All are well known approximately, but none appear by the text or plans precisely located, so as to be with certainty followed on the ground to-day. (1) But surely the King's Mill, opposite the Horn-

(1) In company with Sir James LeMoine, who lives on the very ground, Spencer Grange, we have not been able with the lately given data to follow Howe's Light Infantry in the scaling of the cliff, nor on their march to the Samos Battery.

Work qui coupait le passage du chemin de la Petite-rivière, Foligny, in Doughty, Vol. IV., p. 207, and still in existence in 1829, might have being properly indicated there, as the end of the fight, when it was secured by placing a guard, and not at the foot of *Coté d'Abran* (1) as both authors have placed it.

A proof of the fallacy of some statements of facts, and that no complete reliance can be placed on Mr. Doughty's divers composite plans, nor on his personal apprehension of authorities and documents, is given in the instance of Borgia's house. It was the most advanced post towards the town secured at first by Wolfe on the Ste.-Foye Road, with the intent to rest his left thereon and form his line. This strategic point was not at the foot of Maple Avenue far away off (one-third of a mile back), but at the present car-sheds of the Electric Railway Co., where Major Wood, as suggested to him, correctly places the two burnt houses of Borgia and Manseau, with the latter's tan-mill.

Save in this last instance, (a striking mistake and false start, upsetting at the outset a foregone theory of Mr. Doughty's plans), we do not find Major Wood controverting any of the plans or statements published by Mr. Doughty, though all of these plans differ more or less from one another in important details, as may be easily ascertained by superposing them all, and with the same scale, on the large cadastral plan, or by means of side-light projections thereon.

Somehow or other, Mr. Doughty seems to have been perplexed and half buried under a confusing avalanche of his own papers, since he has had to compile from the same no less than three consecutive composite plans of his own, relating to the same battle of the Plains, all different, and each of them asserted by him to be perfectly accurate when published; the first, in 1899, with his above-mentioned paper, absurd at first sight; the second in 1901, for the Siege of Quebec, and the last in 1904, revising and correcting this second one for "Quebec Under Two Flags."

Moreover, the most interesting and emotional point, in fact the crucial one, in this case, is yet left in doubt.

The sacred spot where Wolfe fell has, to this day, been believed, known and properly fixed by a boundary and stone memorial on Wolfe's Redoubt, by Major Holland, who was present at the battle. Outside of this landmark, Mr. Doughty has successively found and mapped three other spots: the first, quite near the Female Orphan Asylum; (2), the second, much further back, near to and between the gaol and Gaol street; he third and last, beyond this Gaol street.

(1) So it was pronounced at the time, as now in common parlance, and so written on English maps "Abraom" "Abran."

(2) Evidently an error equal to that of the Borgia house; a bad beginning and a worse ending.

This strange puzzle might likely be ascribed to his draughtsmen, or to some peculiar misunderstanding among four different brains at work. Why Major Wood has adopted the second situation, about 300 yards from the monument, instead of the proved indication of about 100 yards from the same, is an averment for which we cannot find any reason in his text or any evidence beyond his faith in the finding of Mr. Doughty. This finding may be correct, but it ought to be plainly demonstrated and not left to be ascertained by the inquisitive reader elsewhere and by other means.

Accompanying Major Wood's book is one of the plans published by Mr. Doughty, the colored one, page 264, in the first vol. The position and formation of the English line shown thereon disagrees with the description in his own text, we should say disproves it. On the plan both the English and French lines extend only to half the distance between Grande-Allée and Ste.-Foye Road; the English right does not nearly reach the cliff, and the left is not at all on the Ste.-Foye Road. Burton's reserve, the 48th, is evidently on the race-course, and between the lower and upper roads on the race-course, thus agreeing with Hawkins' plan, and not near the corner of the Grande-Allée and Maple Avenue, as said on p. 236.

Nevertheless, save, perhaps, the too far advanced English lines and some omissions and interruptions, the description of the battle of the Plains is graphic and well rendered on the English side, with some new and interesting details. On the French side, it hardly deserves the name of a battle and none of the fame it bears. It was a rash attack, followed by an immediate rout. The intervening coppice which caused the breaking, half way, of the French *front de bandière*, by dividing it in three columns, decided the fate of the day, at the outset of the engagement. The *bandière* is not mentioned and the coppice is omitted; as it was the main cause of the defeat, both cause and effect ought to appear conspicuously.

The account of the battle of Ste.-Foye is too meagre. Dumont's mill, taken and retaken several times with equal courage and stubborn fighting on both sides, is not even mentioned, nor is his house. But the monument now erected there supplies the omission.

The narrative is sometimes interrupted by side issues, considerations and repetitions. Foot-notes or an appendix might properly replace these otherwise interesting interludes.

The strictures on Lévis are erroneous and undeserved. True, he burnt the French colours to save his men the anticipated humiliation of surrendering them, and he did right. He also refused to surrender his sword without the honors of war. Fighting to the last is not a "suicide" nor a "bravado," for a French soldier, but a glorious death, numerous examples of which are universally admired. *La garde meurt mais ne se*

rend pas. Lévis had the same unconquered spirit and martial honor as the brave Vauquelain, who, after having spent his last cartridge, would not lower his flag.

It is preposterous to believe that French officers of the stamp of Lévis, Bourlamaque, Bougainville, D'Alquier, Pouchot, LaCorne, and all the others, whose character and names alone *jurent pour eux*, would have stupidly joined in a palpable and barefaced falsehood that they never had any colors. Both armies must have seen them. Why did not Amherst give the lie at once to such a pack of donkeys, instead of giving his subsequent account and insinuations, which he most likely had gathered from the cowardly babbling of Vaudreuil. The fact is simple: the French had no colours, because they had been destroyed in due time: a quite different story from the assertion that they never had had any.

Nevertheless, Parkman, according to Mr. Eudore Evanturel, who worked three years at his side, held the opinion that the regiments in Canada, being part only of regiments in France, the colours remained at their headquarters, and that the French regulars had only *guidons*. Jeffereys' map would seem to indicate these as such in front of their *bandière* for each regiment.

This book will, no doubt, appear in a second edition. Some few inaccurate, but not very material passages, might be rectified. Montcalm did not entertain in the house on the Ramparts in 1757-58. He had only his lodgings there from the 22nd December, 1758, according to his Journal. He did not die in the house of Arnoux the younger.

Montcalm died where he was carried and lodged in the house of Arnoux, senior, the King's surgeon, (Cf. Johnstone, his aide-de-camp), now the officers' barracks, 59, St-Louis St. He was attended there by the younger Arnoux. There is no proof that the latter had a house or office in St-Louis street, and there never existed any tradition, and there is no evidence adduced, that Montcalm died in the house photographed by Mr. Wurtele, or that it was ever occupied by the younger Arnoux, or by Joseph, the other brother, an apothecary, but the contrary is established. Cf. *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques*, janv., 1903, & seq., and Mr. Wurtele himself.

Major Wood has copied from former Canadian writers an error hardly to be pardoned to Quebeckers. He has mistaken the present Rue du Parloir for the former street of that name, which ran in front of the present Archbishop's Palace. The three ladies alluded to by Montcalm were Mesdames de Boishébert, née de Lanaudière, Joseph-Marin de la Margue, née Charlotte de Fleury; and de Beaubassin, née Jarest de Verchères, who occupied two adjoining houses, the only ones in that street. Mme. Péan (not de Pean) did not live in the former Rue du Parloir, but in her splendid house in St. Louis street, now No. 59. Cf. *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques*, vol. 9, p. 37, note.

It would be interesting to find out whether the capitulation signed "*au camp devant Quebec, le 18 Septembre, 1759*," was not *de facto* signed in the large two-storied stone house of Madame de Mortville, opposite Mr. D'Artigny's mill, on Grande-Allée. Townshend occupied it for his quarters and lodgings. And since the English were advanced with their trenches, "*à une demi-portée de fusil des murs, dès le 14*." (C. F. Foligny) this house would then have been within the extent of the camp. Moreover, two days of heavy rain was no small inducement to make use of it as a convenient shelter, the moment the white flag was shown. The articles were agreed to before 11 o'clock p.m., on the 17th, and very likely the parties met there next morning at 8, when the French duplicates of the articles, duly copied in the meantime, were handed for signature.

Much might be said in this connection about the chances and fortunes of war, in which Wolfe believed, and by which he was eminently served, indeed more than Major Wood will allow. Also, on the Brigadiers' plan of a descent above Cap-Rouge and on Wolfe's own plan to continue the attack from Montmorency. The Brigadiers' plan prevailed, but the mode of executing it, by the surprise of Vergor's post below Cap-Rouge, is entirely to the credit of Wolfe, as well as its perfect and secret organization, with the addition of the blessing of God, whose Providence governs all things. Let us see if what is generally called the chances and fortune of war was not signally allotted to Wolfe.

It is well known that the best mode to disperse a riotous mob is a dash of a good stream of water on the crowd. Providence sent it by a storm and a torrent of splashing rain on the repulse at Montmorency, and saved the retreating English ranks from a general slaughter before reaching their boats. (1).

Again two days' rain with a cold N.E. wind just before the 10th prevented the descent planned and ordered for the 9th above Cap-Rouge. (Wolfe's dispatch of this date). Had it been so effected the Foulon attack would never have been thought of nor mentioned. Thus stress of weather was the immediate cause of the return of Wolfe's former idea of trying the spot of the Foulon by a surprise on Vergor's post. This plan he had long meditated, but found too desperate to hazard with reasonable hope of success; (2) and therefore he had finally acquiesced in the Brigadiers' plan, but most likely with an *arrière pensée* on his

(1) A similar occurrence happened at the battle of Mount Tabor, when the prophetess Deborah, having taken command of Berak's small army, attacked the numerous host of the Canaanites. A great storm with a vast quantity of rain and hail, together with the wind blowing in the face of the enemy, causing them to be completely routed. Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, B.V., ch. v. s. 4.

(2) "It seems so hazardous that I thought best to desist." Wolfe to the Minister, 2nd Sept. Knox, II, p. 44.

part. However the season was now pressing him, and no hope of aid from Amherst was to be expected. He knew the enterprise was depending on a thread. "An officer and 30 men would have made it impossible to get up there," to use his own words in relation to the much easier landing at Louisburg, the attempt of which, he says, "was rash, injudicious, success (to me), unexpected and undeserved, and by the greatest of good fortune imaginable we succeeded." Still the Foulon was his only and last resort. He had to strike a blow, by some means or other, before abandoning Quebec. Moreover he was not the man to put the line of Cap-Rouge river in front of him, whilst Bougainville with his 2,000 men would be at his heels. By the fortune of war the tenuous thread held good as long as the dastardly Vergor remained sound asleep, and there was not among his men a single one acting as sentry, not a goose of the Capitol awake to give the alarm during that night.

This rash, hazardous and desperate attack, *coup-d'état*, says Knox, which ought to have been abortive for a number of reasons, according to Wolfe's own opinion, (1), was carried out without any opposition, save a few shots when Vergor's post was reached and his men put to flight. (2).

La fortune rectifie les fautes des gens heureux. Wolfe was so far from being sanguine of success that he had resolved to sacrifice in the attempt only a few men, a small forlorn-hope party, and had kept the rest of his troops in their boats anxiously awaiting there the all-eventful signal to leap on shore.

Another peculiar piece of good luck was the absence of the Guienne battalion on the Heights. Certainly Wolfe could not be aware of the counter-order given on the eve by Vaudreuil, preventing that regiment from being stationed at the Foulon as Montcalm would have had it. "A lucky incident," says Moncrief.

Altogether the *Fight for Canada* will be held a valuable and most

(1) After his repulse at Montmorency, Wolfe had become diffident and despondent. In his same despatch of the 9th Sept. he complains that his constitution is ruined without the consolation of having done any considerable service to the State and without any prospect of it.

He was "loath to sacrifice the life of even a few men without the hope of a possibility of success," and had promised the Brigadiers to abandon the siege if the contemplated attempt should fail—(the one above Cap Rouge).

(2) Let any person possessed with any degree of military talent look on the above scheme, and view with an intelligent eye the dangers and the seeming impossibilities of duly executing it, and he must really imagine that it proceeded from a distempered mind, bordering on the brink of desperation."

Memoirs of Sergeant Johnston, in Doughty. *The Siege of Quebec*, V. p. 100

interesting contribution to the history of the conquest of New France, and is fully entitled to a large share of public favor, and it particularly deserves to be welcomed by the well-read classes of both races in Canada.

Moreover it ought to be read abroad; for in our opinion the paramount value of this work is the object lesson to be derived therefrom by the naval and military authorities at Home; which lesson they may there learn and read, not only between the lines, but in terse expressions and strong language, such as Junius would have been willing to use under present circumstances. Should the men in power condescend to notice this book and lay aside their permanent conceit, routine and red tape, they might profit by the experience of the last two centuries so truly expounded by Major Wood. They would become able to learn, and teach as well as the Japanese, the art and management of war, and in a more immediate and practical manner than by Royal Commissions. Thus in future the Camperdown disaster (crime), and the long "muddle-through" of the Boer War need not be repeated; much less should stupid blunders and bad tactics be hushed and buried in silent oblivion.

It is to be hoped that Major Wood's bright talent will continue to enrich our Canadian literature.

P.-B. CASGRAIN.

At the sea-side, Kamouraska, August, 1904

It is but fair that I should here reproduce Mr. Bradley's answer to my cursory and merely incidental notice of his work, after which I shall add my reply thereto in a more extensive criticism, for the purpose of respectfully submitting my remarks to the several members of the Press who have welcomed his volume, so that on a stricter examination they may I presume, agree, in part at least, with my own appreciation

THE FIGHT WITH FRANCE

FOR NORTH AMERICA

To the Editor "*Daily Telegraph*."

Dear Sir,—Mr. Casgrain's somewhat ill-mannered outburst *re* my book *The Fight with France for North America*, though sadly belated—as the said work is going into its third edition—has entertained me vastly. I do not propose to waste space over the trifling errors of detail in which an amateur reviewer, whose religious or racial toes are trodden on, loves to revel in, nor to waste words with a man who professes to believe that the story of Le Loutre and Acadia is fiction. But the picture of my gazing across the Atlantic with "narrow-mind from a school-boy desk" is quite delicious. I may fairly venture the statements that I have forgotten more about the British American colonies and their story than Mr. Casgrain probably ever knew. Mr. Casgrain may be surprised to hear that I have spent about a third of my existence, since reaching man's estate, in the Atlantic States, and that over a quarter of a century ago I had already contributed numerous papers to the leading Reviews on colonial, historical or social topics, written with the fulness of local knowledge and an intimacy with the various sections and cleavages of America that only comes by years of association. Mr. Casgrain might also be interested to hear that these earlier studies brought me the acquaintance of Mr. Francis Parkman, who did me the honor to pay me an unsolicited visit the first time I was in Boston. He was then engaged on "Montcalm and Wolfe," and I am proud to remember that, though quite a young man, I was able to be of some slight assistance to him in a matter concerning certain regions he did not personally know. M. Casgrain appears to think my book was published recently in Canada for export to England! He really should keep a little in touch with the literary world. *The Fight with France* was published by Constable in London four years ago, was the subject of lengthy reviews or leading articles in every important paper in Great Britain and most of the great papers in the States. A large drawer crammed full of cuttings at my elbow now bears eloquent testimony to the almost universal chorus of approval with which the book was received upon both sides by the most competent critics. I shall endeavor therefore to remain calm under the belated observations of your French-Canadian correspondent and no doubt shall be assisted in that arduous struggle by the recollection that Upper Canadians appear to have agreed with the verdict on the book given by the rest of the world.

Mr. Casgrain does not approve of "atmosphere" in history or what he clumsily calls "the description of bucolic scenes." Mere students of the closet are sometimes built that way, and are denied unhappily for them and their readers all sense of inspiration from that source. As well talk music to a deaf man, Mr. Casgrain does not like my style. I am sorry. But the late Lord Acton, admittedly the keenest literary critic, the greatest historical thinker and the most brilliant Englishman of his day, held so opposite an opinion that he invited me to contribute to that great work of his foundation, "The Cambridge Modern History," Perhaps Mr. Casgrain has never heard of Lord Acton, and does not know that the above mentioned work now appearing in volumes is the leading event of the current years in British historical circles. He does not even seem to be aware that Macaulay is the most florid and most fiercely partisan of all our great historians. He forgets the fact too that my book is the story of the Seven Years' War in which the battle of Quebec is but an incident, that Major Wood's, on the contrary, is the history of the siege to which a sketch of the period leading up to it is prefixed. Mr. Casgrain might also be interested to know that I am the only person now living who has had access to Wolfe's correspondence at Squerryes, its owner being personally known to me of old. Perhaps he does not know what, or where Squerryes is, or that Wolfe's life story is mainly derived from that wonderful MSS. correspondence of 170 letters? At any rate, a reviewer who can speak of an author, at least much better known in the world than himself and who has, I think I may confidently say, a much wider experience of it, as "this Bradley", can hardly be a competent judge of the amenities of English style or literary etiquette, and had better confine himself to criticisms in a language which he understands, and in whose literature he is, let us hope, more at home.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

A. G. BRADLEY.

Passing over the author's apology for the rather too extensive title of his book, to come to the edition now before me, *The Fight with France for North America* by A. G. Bradley, author of "Wolfe," "Sketches from Old Virginia," etc., second edition revised, and with illustrations, Toronto, George N. Morang & Company, Limited, 1902, I presume this must be the book recently published in Canada, and made "lucid enough when it is considered how hazy is everything transatlantic to the English mind. (p. VIII,)" and therefore to be exported to the Mother Country, if it may reach its destination. Am I mistaken as to the identity of this book? Or am I wrong in my deduction when the author's own words convey this meaning and purpose. (p. VII)?

On opening this volume, my duty was and is to discriminate between the author and the person; for I must confess that being conversant with the many works on the same subject, in both languages, French and English, I felt somewhat prejudiced against a newcomer, treading over the same ground, and I thought he would give some sort of valid reason, as Major Wood did, for adding another volume to the already voluminous bibliography relating to the same matter, and for increasing the number of scribblings to which we already have *ad nauseam* been treated.

I also expected to meet with some newly discovered important facts, details and information, or the elucidation of some debatable point, in a word, to find more light thrown upon the whole course of events, during this seven years' period, as the result of recent researches made by Mr. Bradley. But I find he has been all along merely compiling from all sorts of well-known sources, and entirely dispensing with references to the authorities relied on. How are these to be checked if they are not indicated? He contents himself with giving his own version and appreciation, as if he were preaching *ex cathedra* in the most approved manner.

He might as well assert his authority in the following sentence: "What I say is true, and it is because I say so."

This assumption led me, at first, to run through many of his pages diagonally with my finger's end, and skip over landscape drawings, pastoral scenes and other increments, as well as the idle speculations regarding what might have happened had there been no Pompadour and no banishment of Huguenots, &c.

Nevertheless, in order to form a more correct opinion and enlightened judgment, for my own satisfaction, I carefully read the volume over again and with the same expectation of finding some new matter, or valuable information to add to the small store of knowledge the author grants me. Would he favor me, as being a student eager to learn, by indicating a page or passage containing some interesting historical discovery, unknown fact, or new point elucidating the causes and march of events, and particularly "some of the few incidents" (*p. VI*) he relates as not having been told before: the whole as the result of his fruitful labours and investigations,—not forgetting withal to direct me to the proper references consigned in reliable sources?

But before assailing his "quick-works," I must compliment him, as an author, on the many flattering notices he received or secured from the Press, also on the honor of the unsolicited visit from Parkman (whose acquaintance I also happened to enjoy);—moreover, on the high patronage of and association with a Lord, and a Lord of the literary standing of Lord Acton; without omitting the flourish of "the universal chorus of competent critics," &c., &c.

I also willingly concede that the author may be admired as a charming story-teller,—though a superficial historian,—possessed at his pleasure of a style alternately brilliant, florid, vigorous, poetical, bucolic, idyllic, sentimental and attractive, perhaps sometimes a little high-flown and intemperate, as when mentioning the bigoted priests, papists, &c., otherwise “musical,” if you like. And I likewise admit his talent and qualifications as a narrator to stir up interest in the spicy manner of a fresh novel, and thereby secure a transient success among the public at large, if not in the eyes of a learned and inquisitive class of readers, “or with the serious student” (p. VI). However it does not seem to me an easy matter for him to adapt to history this Jules Verne method of composition. I prefer Taine’s true and simple exposition as any historian, and the clear method he has adopted in writing history by giving at once all the references. Mr. Bradley has thought fit to have recourse to what he himself rightly describes as “American light literature.” (p. 32).

The *Spectator* says Mr. Bradley writes “almost as eloquent English as Macaulay,” and the author did not forget to prefix the compliment, with a like one from the *Globe*, to his book. Why then does he find fault with me for having deservedly paid the same compliment to Major Wood? Now he is disparaging Macaulay’s style and, through spite, repudiating the same compliment or comparison when shared by another.

All the peans of praise—not “peans of songs,” or peans that were sung (p. 257). which is a pleonasm—all the high coloring, painting and thick varnish, and all the glamour of success cannot prevent me from penetrating into the substance of the volume and finding out its intrinsic value, as it now stands before me, a Quebecker. His book, and his book alone, is what concerns me for the present. Its true appreciation by and political application to both sides of the Atlantic deserve to be carefully treated, and more particularly his conception of the Acadian troubles and their woful ending.

Not belonging to the Bury-Acton School I confess that the only literary contributions of his which heretofore have come to my knowledge are *Wolfe* (1895) and *Canada in the Twentieth Century* (1903). But to be candid with him, Wright had done so full justice to the hero of the Conquest, that Mr. Bradley’s effort only served to partly refresh my memory on the subject. Since Wright, some time before 1864, had had access to the MSS. of Wolfe’s letters, some 240 in number, (which Mr. Bradley limits to 170), it seems immaterial whether he be “the only person now living(?) who can boast of having had access to the domestic papers at Squerryes,” as, with that privilege and great advantage at his disposal, he did neither anticipate nor improve on Wright’s narrative. And as he classes himself among the middle aged, I may be permitted to reckon he could not be very far from his “schoolboy desk” at the beginning of the sixties.

Now, since he does not deny the "trifling errors" I pointed out, we shall proceed together, and gradually, to the demonstration of some others of a more serious character.

In confounding the two monuments already adverted to, he is also confounding two names and two different parts of a locality, that is to say, The Heights of Abraham (*Les Hauteurs d'Abraham*), and the Plains of Abraham (p. 320). This latter appellation was unknown at the time of the Conquest and for some years afterwards. Could the author let his readers know when and where he first found this name of *The Battle of the Plains of Abraham*?

For he is certainly aware that, according to Dr. Doughty, who is supposed to be a good authority, the Plains of Abraham never formed part of the battle-field. How does he explain away this divergency? Has this point escaped his attention, as too trifling a matter?

The local pilots (p. 295) who were treacherously invited in response to false French flags to come on board, were not enticed so at l'Isle-aux-Coudres, but much farther down, on the passage up the river, where the parish priest, who witnessed the dire deception with a telescope, dropped down and expired. (Knox, I. p. 282). The principal pilot was Captain DeVitré, hailing from Quebec, and a recent prisoner of war on parole at Alesford, in England, who had been kidnapped, pressed on board of Admiral Durell's ship at Portsmouth, and forced to serve as pilot at the peril of his life.

Although it be a *hors-d'œuvre*, I challenge Mr. Bradley's mention (p. 183) of Lord Charles Hay's request at Fontenoy. The authentic version is the reverse of that implied by the author, and is: *Messieurs les Anglais, tirez les premiers*.

My great-grand father was there, serving in the *Brigade Irlandaise*, which together with *La Maison du Roi*, retrieved the day. I ought to know something about it. Let Mr. Bradley also recollect that his *God save the King* was stolen long ago from Lulli.

The *assassinat de Jumonville*, sent on a parley in time of peace, is plainly set down in the articles of Washington's capitulation at Fort Necessity, and under his very signature. The attempt (pp. 68 to 72) to disguise this admission of a treacherous murder, is so lamely put forth that the explanation appears bluntly stupid. The articles having been read in French, Van Braam, it is said, gave the translation in English, as follows: "The killing or death of Jumonville," *Verba volant*; the document remains. Are these the exact words? "Killing" and "death" here disagree, and two words are too many to render the one *assassinat*. Anyway the mere pronounciation of the word could not escape the ear, nor its orthography, the intelligent eye of Washington, who was not an indifferent scholar, and at sight knew the meaning of the expression. "That it was dark and rainy, and the signature innocently affixed"—may

be said to an unreasoning school-boy. The word presented no ambiguity to the French officers. Did they, together with Van Braam, without any discussion, designedly deceive Washington; and was Washington the man to let himself be deceived on such a grave charge as a confession of murder, and on such a solemn occasion? Did he not have with him the exchanged duplicate of the articles so signed? Such reasoning is a mere play on words. The two hostages Stobo and Van Braam, who were detained in Quebec, from July, 1754 till after the beginning of the year 1759, never called in question nor protested against this *assassination*, which created such a great commotion, not only in the colony, but in Europe. Washington himself could not protest, except by pleading that he had signed the confession under duress and from necessity.

If any plausible reason could be given in mitigation of the crime, and for the benefit of outsiders,—it would be that the articles had to be so signed *nolens volens*, and not on the pitiable plea: “from the misery and discomfort of the situation and in a hurry to terminate the formalities.” (p. 72).

Mr. Bradley casts frequent aspersions and slurs upon the Bishop of Quebec and his bigoted, ferocious, blatant priests, &c., &c. Could he not find some of the violent and scurrilous words pouring out of his vocabulary to stigmatize that doubly dishonoured officer he names Stobo, p. 307), the hostage free on *parole*, in Quebec, acting the spy, as such condemned to death, reprieved from the gallows through the false leniency of Vaudreuil, and then escaping to Wolfe to crown his infamy by continuing his odious work? Jacob Van Braam, his colleague as a hostage, remained honourably at his post till after the surrender of Quebec. He had been acquitted on the same trial.

The simple knowledge (if not the sense) of the rules of honour prevailing among British officers throughout the Empire, should have prevented the author from designedly ignoring these patent facts, the base conduct and the real character of this man, Robert Stobo, and by thus suppressing the whole truth, misleading and deceiving his own countrymen.

The principal interest in the Seven Years' War culminates in Wolfe's victory on the Heights of Abraham. The details of this grand achievement, if at all mentioned, require the utmost care in order to be accurately rendered.

Could not Mr. Bradley determine exactly, with or without the assistance of Dr. Doughty, the site of the Borgia house, on which Wolfe rested his left wing, and thereby settle the true position of the English line when in battle array, whether on the Plains of Abraham or not?

A detail of the utmost importance was the true appointed time of the signal for the troops to drop down with the beginning of the ebbing

tide. Mr. Bradley fixes the hour (p. 318) at 2 of the clock a.m., without regard to the invariable law of nature. A nautical almanac would have given him the day of the moon, and the exact hour of high-tide at Quebec on the night of the 12th-13th September, 1759, that is to say, 11h. 32' before midnight. According to him, Wolfe would have been two hours late in landing, which means that his attempt would have failed if effected in broad-day light.

He says (*Wolfe*, p. 204). Bougainville's force was nearly 3,000 men; in the *Fight with France* (p. 313) he reduces them to 1500, as easily as if cutting an apple in two.

Bougainville did *not* attack Wolfe's rear, as mentioned in Wolfe (p. 197), and he had *not* a body of 350 cavalry, only about 200 in all. An advance party of Bougainville's force, had (*not*) actually attacked the rear *during the battle* (p. 328 *Fight with France*). Burton forming the rear did not move and had no occasion to move; neither did Townshend move toward the rear, and he did not extend the 60th for that purpose; but only at about twelve of the clock he turned about face, when Bougainville with his force put in an appearance and withdrew at once, when he saw the day was lost. This, Mr. Bradley has confounded with the early attack preceding the battle made by an advanced party of Bougainville against the St. Michel house at Samos, where the French battery had been taken at daybreak. This attack to recover the house was repulsed with a loss of two officers and about thirty Frenchmen.

At the battle of Sainte-Foye (or Sillery, as the English call it) the retreat (p. 368) was *not* conducted in good order. The defeat and rout were general and complete on all the line. The cannons (18 if not the whole 22), munitions and tools, the dead and the greater number of the wounded were abandoned and left on the field. The pursuit by the French was feeble; they had lost heavily and they were completely exhausted after eight days of heavy marching from Montreal, being poorly fed and having had no time to refresh themselves.

The panic and demoralization were such among the flying English that the officers could not rally their men, and the French might have taken the opportunity of entering the town on their heels, and even the next day, so much disorder was there prevailing.

I take exception to the *Pall Mall Gazette* saying of "you Mr. Bradley are undeniable graphic in all your descriptions of battles."

(1) "*For a moment*," writes Mr. Bradley. (p. 386), who often relies on Knox, "there had been faint signs" of "demoralization in the shape of drunkenness."

"Immense irregularities are hourly committed by the soldiery, breaking open stores and dwelling houses to get at liquor; this is seemingly the result of panic and despair, heightened by drunkenness; one man was hanged this evening in *terrorem*, without any trial." *Knox* II, p. 298, April 30th. During three days!!

I contend, on the contrary, that I have proved him to be inaccurate, misled and prejudiced; I can add that he does not seem to be a painstaking scholar, and far from being rightly called a bookworm, his works do not as yet smell of the lamp.

The six maps he produces as illustrations are all wanting in compass. One might as well board a ship without a helm. He writes at random "Pippéral," "Pipperall" (p. 156), "Pipperell" (155), "Abernakis" for Abénakis, "Rochelle" for La Rochelle, "La Hontaine" for La Hontan, *à l'outrance*, which is not French, etc., etc.

In a revised edition, these other additional blemishes prove carelessness, negligence and inattention, if not something more. He does not even now quote my words correctly. I did not write "this Bradley," which is not polite, but "this Mr. Bradley," which is not offensive. *Ce Monsieur Bradley* is quite current among the better class.

* * *

The foregoing remarks, among others of the same nature, may be comparatively of little importance to the general range of readers. Nevertheless they ought not to be disregarded in forming an opinion of the book. But the following are certainly deserving of serious consideration and, I may add, they contain the true motive for and my only purpose in continuing this discussion—that is to say, to review that part of the volume which gives a synopsis of the Acadian troubles and the deportation of the whole colony of Acadians from that portion of territory in Nova Scotia ceded by France to England. The short narrative given will pale amazingly before the light of an investigation more careful than the one bestowed on it by the author. It will tone down considerably when coming to hard facts and accuracy of statements.

The recent researches made and the documents found within the last twenty years have given the counterparts of the former accepted version, as summarized by Parkman in "Wolfe and Montcalm," and analyzed therefrom by Mr. Bradley.

A controversy, by correspondence, between Parkman and the late well-known Abbé Casgrain brought up afresh the discussion and study of the whole Acadian history. In this view the Abbé visited twice the sites of the Acadian establishments of old, and consulted the Archives of Nova Scotia at Halifax. He then specially went over to the British Museum and the Colonial Office in London; also to the Archives in Paris. As the result of his labors, he published, in 1888, *Documents inédits sur le Canada et l'Amérique publiés par "Le Canada Français."* These papers were partly the basis of his work *Pèlerinage au pays d'Évangéline* (1888), which received much attention at the time and was crowned by the *Académie Française*. A supplement to it was published by him in 1904, under the title of *Une seconde Acadie*.

Subsequently, the late Edouard Richard, M.P. for the Commons of the Dominion of Canada, and afterwards commissioned by its government to report on the documents relating to Canada, to be found in the Archives at Paris, published an elaborate and exhaustive work under the title of *Acadia: missing links of a lost chapter in American History*, New York, Home Book Company, 1895, (1)

Mr. Richard has had the good idea and the courtesy of writing his book in the English language, the vernacular of the largest class of British and American readers to whom he appeals.

Under these circumstances, I make bold to affirm that Mr. Bradley has ignored and still ignores the unpublished correspondence between Abbé Casgrain and Parkman, as well as that published in the "Canada-Francais" on the subject.

Moreover, I feel constrained to assert that he has not taken cognizance of and certainly never alluded to the above recent important publications; otherwise I should have the right of questioning his sincerity, veracity and honesty as an historian.

Rather than suffer such an alternative and imputation on his fair name and honor, Mr. Bradley should—or I shall do so for him—deplore his present discomfiture in the words of Falstaff, *M. W. of W.* 5.5 (howsoever insoluble they still may be to English commentators):

Ignorance itself is a plummet o'er me .

The history of the Acadians has been a riddle vexing the sagacity of students and writers. The present author, "who does not seem to really keep in touch with the literary world" (in this instance at least) draws at sight on the credulity of the people of both sides of the Atlantic, as if they were going, in the face of the revelations now spread abroad, to accept as proved and indisputable every accusation brought or copied by him and others against the Acadians and their missionaries. This light way of simplifying difficulties, coupled with the marked intemperance of his pen, indicates more childish thoughtlessness than breadth of understanding.

It would require a volume to analyse the array of proofs and documents presented by Abbé Casgrain, Richard and George S. Brown. Any common sense and impartial reader, with the least touch of British fair play, will be convinced, unless he prefer to be wilfully blind, of their veracity and honesty; and he will admire the unprejudiced pen of Rich-

(1) George S. Brown, now of Boston, Mass., ex-M.P. for Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, has made a special study of the history of the Acadians and published a work on the subject. Addressing Richard, he writes: "Casgrain lets "in some light, but there is much more to be said in this direction. For the mere sake of truth and justice, I am glad that you lead the way, and that you expose Parkman's perversion of the facts of history, &c. &c. *Richard II.* p. 363.

ard, his calm exposition, broad-mindedness, lofty spirit of independence, masterly judicial criticism and unbounded impartiality.

By comparing the versions of the above writers with that set forth in the *Fight with France*, the reader is allowed by Mr. Bradley (p. 131) "to pass his own judgment on it" and verify (without them) how these people had been treated with a consistent indulgence," etc., etc.

The whole mischief from which resulted the perverted tale of the political life, social existence and deportation of the poor Acadians, rests with Thomas B. Akins, the compiler of the Nova Scotia Archives (1869). It is now established beyond contradiction that he has designedly suppressed, mutilated and falsified by omissions, the documents he was charged to arrange and preserve. He carefully selected, with a clearly demonstrated partiality, all such documents, to show, as he says, *the necessity for their removal and the motives which led to its enforcement* and he carefully, in bad faith and of malice prepense, similar to that of Judge Morris, omitted and suppressed altogether or in part whatever might tend in any way to the justification and defence of the conduct and of the course adopted by the *French Neutrals*.

The missing portion of the same Archives and the disappearance at intervals of documents, carry more than a suspicion of fraud; it is an embezzlement to destroy truth in history. Thus Parkman was prejudiced and deceived by Akins on this matter.

The small remote colony of the Acadians, numbering about 118,000 in 1755, formed a peculiar clannish community.

Their orderly conduct, their integrity, frugality and sobriety are fully recognized. They were known to be an honest, industrious and virtuous people. The simplicity of their manners and their domestic virtues, the peace and harmony that reigned in their midst, their gay character and strict morality, their happiness, until it was blasted by their cruel dispersion to the four winds, have been described by the most competent and knowing authorities of their own country, such as Judge Haliburton, Hon. Watson Brooks, de Lesderniers, Rev. Dr. Brown and others, all Protestants, also by Raynal and other travelers. Their fundamental laws were the ten Commandments.

It seems a fanciful and romantic description of the Golden Age. This pastoral life being too true for the pastel of Mr. Bradley is left aside.

These are the *simple-minded, bigoted, priest-ridden and ignorant papist peasants*, brought to that standard of the true, natural and social civilization of primitive ages, unsurpassed in any country of the world—though it may boast of its learned principles of modern political economy—where anarchists, nihilists, socialists, secret societies and assassins are overthrowing every form of government, in what is called the most highly developed civilization of modern times.

These poor *deluded* creatures, simple and ignorant, submitted to

and suffered the prejudices and intolerance, the vexations and cruelties as well as the absolutism and caprice of their Governors, for the mere sake of keeping the free exercise of their religion, "and for which," they said, "we are content to sacrifice our property." They never rebelled, though they had the physical strength and number on their side to crush the paltry force of 150 men put over them and to whom they passively submitted. In this course, they were actuated by the noblest and dearest of motives, the sacredness of their oath of fidelity and their unfaltering hope in the eternal salvation of their souls. They were crammed (p. 383) *with the same gross fictions and superstitions* as professed openly to this day, by one of the most respected and enlightened Englishman, known to Mr. Bradley as the late Cardinal Newman, who was not inferior to him in intellect.

Such were these *fanatics* of the Church of Canada, whose "bigotry was ferocious," as he is pleased to say.

The oath of allegiance to the King of England taken in 1730, during the administration of General Phillips, was qualified with the reserves; 1. —of the free exercise of their religion; 2. of not taking arms (against the French and the Indians; 3. of being free to withdraw where they liked, and of selling their property, etc. Their right of remaining in possession of their lands, goods, etc., was guaranteed by the Treaty of Utrecht and Queen Anne's letter. Richard, I. p. 142, gives the text.

This oath was afterwards recognized and was formally admitted in writing by several of the succeeding Governors (Richard, 2. v, p. 142), thence their name of *French Neutrals*. So that under the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, and Queen Ann's letter, 1714, the status of the Acadians was and is legally settled and established.

Accordingly, during the war of 1744-1748, the Acadians remained loyal to England and faithful to their oath. In spite of the proclamations of the French and Canadians, during this critical period of four years, they resisted both the allurements and terrifying menaces of their countrymen, even after the battle of Grand-Pré, when that part of the country had been re-conquered as French territory. They remained firm and refused to take up arms and side with the French and Canadians, even against the alleged opinion of the Bishop of Quebec, as reported to them by Ramsay. Very few, indeed, joined the French. Such exceptions are in the nature of things.

At the same time, we must not forget that before and since the year 1730 the Acadians were all unanimously resolved to depart and tried a number of times to leave the country, but were always prevented under divers pretexts, false pretences and subterfuges. The true and underground political reasons were "*that their departure would greatly strengthen the enemy. It would be depriving Great Britain of a very considerable number of useful subjects. How necessary they are to us! how impossible to do*

without them! says Hobson to the Lords of Trade, a short time before the deportation; and that it would make the reclaiming of the Indians impracticable; also, that the colony would thereby be deserted and deprived of its means of subsistence."

With this desire to leave, they all along kept in readiness for that purpose, and at last were "content to leave everything behind them for their religion, and return to the King of France."

As the list of subterfuges is a long one, I may be allowed (says Richard, vol. 2, p. 375) to summarize them thus:

1st subterfuge	(Vetch)	You shall not depart before Nicholson's return.
2nd.	" (Nicholson)	You shall not depart until after such and such points shall have been decided by the Queen.
3rd.	" (Vetch)	You shall not depart in English vessels.
4th.	" (Vetch)	You shall not depart in French vessels.
5th.	" (Vetch)	You cannot procure rigging at Louisbourg (for the vessels you have built).
6th.	" (Vetch)	You cannot procure rigging at Boston.
7th.	" (Vetch)	You shall not depart in your own vessels.
8th.	" (Philipps)	You shall not make roads to depart.
	1730.	Restricted oath accepted.
	1749.	Your oath was worthless.
9th.	" (Cornwallis)	You shall not depart this autumn.
10th.	" (Cornwallis)	You shall not depart until after you have sown your fields.
11th.	" (Cornwallis)	You shall not depart without passports.
		(which were refused).

The appalling misfortunes of these poor people cannot be brought home to the Home Government, and they cannot affect, on the score of justice, the honour of England, who never assented to their deportation, never ordered it, nor did anything that might imply it; quite the contrary.

Lawrence falsely took His Majesty's name to craftily execute his plan of deportation, in defiance to the command of the Lords of Trade: "You are not to attempt their removal without His Majesty's positive order" . . . (Arch. of N. S., p. 58).

The only reproach against the Home authorities is that they benefited by and had to condone the *fait accompli*.

On Lawrence, with the co-operation of the New England governments, must sternly fall before the world the dreadful onus and the indelible opprobrium of the most cruel dispersion and destruction of a people to be found in the annals of history, except the downfall of the Jews under Titus.

This Acadian episode, in Mr. Bradley's book, does not form part, properly speaking, of the Seven Years' War, being anterior to the formal declaration of hostilities, 18th May, 1756. Was it written to give vent to what appears to be his born rabidness against the Church of Rome and its priests? Major Wood has properly left aside the subject.

Mr. Bradley has not observed that Parkman in his last work, "*A Half Century Conflict*," has rectified in part what he had formerly written. (Richard, I, p. 156).

He might have amended much further, but would not, nor did he continue to manfully rectify according to the recent data shown to him. But following the Abbé Vertot in the criticism of his Siege of Malta, he answers: "*Mon siège est fait*." Seldom does an author, no more than a judge, have the courage openly to admit his error, preferring to invoke in his favor the dubious sanction of the dictum "*Res judicata (narrata) pro veritate habetur*."

Mr Bradley has not penetrated the true inwardness of the course of events in this matter, not having had a thorough grasp of details elucidating facts and their purpose.

Concerning the missionaries he has omitted to say they were *all* French and had not taken the oath, as their missions were in part in French territory. However, some of them would not meddle with temporal affairs. Their prosecution of the special work of spiritual ministration eliminates the suspicion that they were inclined towards worldly ends and personal interest. On this point Mr Bradley has singularly emphasized the one-sided view of Parkman against them, and mixes *en bloc* events occurring respectively in peace-time and during war, and he has not always discriminated between Acadians as British subjects and those being French subjects on their own soil.

That some of these missionaries were carried away by an exuberance of patriotism and religious zeal, there is no doubt. That they, on this score, had recourse as agents, on a smaller field, to the same occult diplomacy that always existed and still continues among the powers that be, is no more to be blamed in one case than in the other. Such is the principal business of the Intelligence Office of the British Army and the Diplomatic Service does not spurn it.

Nevertheless, those that came within the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Quebec were warned to remain within the bounds of their clerical duties. In refutation of page 127 of his, I will refer Mr. Bradley to the letter addressed to Le Loutre, translated and quoted at length by Richard, (vol. I, p. 300), containing a severe reprimand from the Bishop for not having followed his previous admonitions.

The original may be seen at the Bishop's Palace, Quebec.

Le Loutre was certainly guilty of exciting the Indians to war against the English, though they had just cause to fight them on their

own behalf and defend their rights as masters on their own soil. Le Loutre was a French missionary among the Micmac Indians on French soil (New Brunswick), and not among those in the peninsula. He was a *Breton*, a fiery, domineering zealot; able, energetic and patriotic, more fit to be a warrior than to wear the cassock. The worst charge against him—and swallowed by Mr. Bradley, as by many others willing to draw plausible and suitable inferences from unproven facts—is that of exciting the Indians of his mission to murder Commissioner (called Captain) Howe, an English officer, and it has not been proved. Parkman, (*A Half Cent. Conf.*, vol. II, p. 197). But we have now the evidence that a few days before he had warned Howe to take care not to expose himself within range of the fire of these Indians.

The second worst charge is, says Mr. Bradley, the burning of an Acadian village by setting fire "to it with his own hands, to drive them into exile." (p. 54).

These statements, as set forth, are two errors of fact. "With his own hands" is a mere assertion. It was the Indians that burned the village, at the instigation of the French, including Le Loutre, to destroy the place, as a military precaution, with the understanding that their King would pay the loss. The other object was not to send these inhabitants into exile, but to bring them under the command and protection of the French fort. With all his faults, Le Loutre had no selfish end in view, but hardships and privations to endure, possibly martyrdom, the same as Father Râle suffered at the time. He had remained comparatively quiet for seven years up to the time hostilities began and actual war was declared (1744). When the French attacked and conquered Grand-Pré against Noble, he helped his countrymen and whatever cruelties were, then or afterwards, committed, by the Indians or the whites, they were the same on each side, and not worse in character than those resorted to everywhere in America, where war was carried on. Glencoe is of the same date.

Retaliation by the English against the Indians might be condoned, but the atrocious and barbarous murder of French women and children by the English, or rather the American troops, were frightful and revolting. No wonder, when they paid twenty-five pounds for Indian scalps! All counted!

However, the most refined and diabolical wickedness is the nefarious design of General Amherst of spreading small-pox among the Detroit Indians, by putting in their way as spoils contaminated blankets, which caused immediate and terrible havoc among them—"to exterminate that abominable race," he says. (*Correspondence, Amherst and Bouquet*).

When it is remembered that Le Loutre ransomed with his own money English prisoners from the Indians; that, after seven years of close imprisonment in the Jersey Castle of Montorgueil, without having been

tried, though he often petitioned for it; deprived of all communication, and obliged to pay the expenses of his imprisonment; (*Doc. Ied. p.p. 48-49*) that he simply was discharged, that he then returned to serve the few remnants of the Acadian flock at l'Isle-de-Rhé, and spent the whole of his inheritance in supporting and ministering to them till the end of his days, it must be granted he has many redeemable characteristics in his favor. One thing he lacked; he was not on the winning side. Otherwise success would have been a sure vindication of his conduct.

The other Acadian priests were far from sharing "Le Loutre's violence." (*Half. Cent. Conf. II., p. 197*), but their influence was often directed to withdraw the inhabitants from allegiance to King George.

How far they are blamable under the circumstances, depends on the point of view taken from either side. There were, properly speaking, no ascertained limits between the French and the English possessions. This unhappy people were between two fires, if not three, on account of the mutability of the Indians. All they desired was to be left alone. Their conversion to Protestantism was strenuously aimed at as {a political measure, even by the low means of pecuniary and other rewards.} Is it not natural that the missionaries should have worked to transfer them to French territory?

The foregoing developments are not to be found, or only in an imperfect form, in Mr. Bradley's work. He has enhanced the one-sided views of Parkman, and not taken into account the latter writer's subsequent more moderate temper.

Nor has he studied the numerous recent documents relating to the Acadians.

Studying and learning history, and reading mentally at a distance the course of events as it really was developed at the time, is very different from writing it afterwards with perfect accuracy, as may be seen from the divergencies and the mistakes of so many authors. *Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis.*

This is the true crucial test whereby to judge the intuition of writers.

The period beginning with the end of the 17th century may be thought semi-barbarous from many a standpoint. Protestants and Catholics were most bitter foes, thereby recalling the words of Ammianus Marcellinus, speaking of the divisions among some of the early Christians "*Non bestia tam fera quam, etc.*"

Puritans were hanging and burning a lot of pretended sorcerers at Salem for witchcraft, and the court of Spain was enjoying an *auto-da-fé* with the same gusto as a bull-fight; Huguenots banished for troubling the peace and Irish priests drawn to the gallows for saying mass; Catholics expelled from Georgia, and debarred from citizenship all over Great Britain; whites conquering and expelling Indians from their

own soil, etc., etc.; what a vast field for rival opinions and prejudices and crude expositions of the same from all sides in those times! Can Mr. Bradley be said to be an accurate and faithful guide in the intricacies of the situation, and did he compose his history without indulging in the prejudices and passions which usually affect the contemporary mind?

I believe he has not, and I therefore prefer to rely on Rev. Dr. Brown, de Lesderniers, Hqn. Brooks Watson, Murdoch, Rameau, Casgrain, Richard and Geo. S. Brown, in contradiction to Parkman and in refutation of Mr. Bradley. This author has set forth his own particular version, and as he was undecided and puzzled for an apt title to his work, I will suggest the following: *My Own History of the Seven Years' War in North America.* (1).

On parting with the author I claim to have used towards him personally no language that would disgrace a gentleman. Nevertheless, I beg to apologize to him, not that I have given a substantial cause for offence, but because it seems I have hurt the feelings of his over-sensitive temperament by touching to the quick the known jealousy of authors in general. Railing with a caustic pen may sometimes look unpleasant, but when devoid of vulgarity, is fairly permissible among equals. Moreover, I took care to use only the same expressions as I found in the book before me; "narrow-minded" (officer) is at p. 238; and I used the same kid gloves he offered me.

It is not given to all to preserve genial manners and dandy "etiquette" under provocation. Mr Bradley's harsh censure, repeated "amenities" and marked stinging sarcasms insulting to my creed and its ministers; his enjoyment in treading, as he says, *on my religious or racial toes*, could not be allowed to pass without a retort. I have not the honor and pleasure of a personal acquaintance with the author; but he has been so kind as to send me by his letter his portrait according to our saying: *Celui qui écrit une lettre, envoie son portrait*. I have no doubt that if we should happen to meet he would look much better and a true gentleman, and that I should be able to shake hands with my bucolic friend in a frank and hearty maner. In the meantime, I say to him, *au revoir et sans rancune*.

P.-B. CASGRAIN.

(1) A waggish reader has perceived the indefinite and dubious meaning of the heading of Mr. Bradley's book by adding to its title in pencil thus: *The Fight with France by Indians for North America and with the Six Nations.*

